Myanmar’s military-backed administration is again trying to put the long-stalled Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) project on the agenda. This time, Russia has emerged as a potential partner for some of its port and energy plans, but it remains unclear whether it can turn the area into a functioning economic zone.
The Dawei SEZ, with its proposed deep-sea port, sits on Myanmar’s Andaman coast. It faces the Indian Ocean and has an overland connection to Thailand and the wider Mekong region. The 138-kilometer-long Dawei-Htee Khee road, opened in 2013 but still requiring major upgrades, could connect the SEZ to the Southern Economic Corridor through Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Ho Chi Minh City. For Thailand and the wider Mekong, Dawei could offer a westward route to the Indian Ocean that bypasses the Strait of Malacca. This position has long underpinned the project’s strategic and economic significance.
Dawei was an ambitious project from the beginning. Launched in 2008 under Myanmar’s military regime, it combined a deep-sea port, an industrial estate, power generation and utilities, and a road link across the border to Thailand. The early estimates for the entire project exceeded $50 billion. However, financial and development problems led to major restructuring in 2015–16, during Myanmar’s democratic transition. The challenge was raising enough capital and moving different parts of the project forward together.
The industrial zone needed power, water, transport, and access to a seaport. The port, in turn, relied on cargo and industrial activity. Investors also needed confidence that the wider infrastructure would be built. Much of Dawei’s regional potential also rested on having a reliable connection to Thailand. Yet the Dawei-Htee Khee road on the Myanmar side was poorly suited to serve as a major industrial corridor. Limited border facilities and cargo transfer capacity created additional bottlenecks.
Successive governments tried to address these constraints during Myanmar’s decade of political and economic opening. Myanmar and Thailand created a joint development vehicle in 2013, and Japan joined in 2015. Later, the government recast the Dawei project into initial and full phases. The first, smaller phase was estimated to cost about $1.7 billion. Financing remained difficult. In January 2020, under Myanmar’s elected civilian government, the Dawei SEZ Management Committee revised the concession terms to allow staged financing and reduce extra government risk.
By December 2020, it had terminated all nine initial-phase contracts with Italian-Thai Development after repeated delays and unmet financial obligations. The committee said the termination would allow it to rethink the project and seek new partners. The decision came just weeks before the February 2021 coup.
Dawei was hard to manage even when Myanmar had more access to international investors and development partners. Its problems with coordination and financing now exist in a much tougher economic, political, and security environment.
An ISP-Myanmar report based on official investment data shows recorded FDI falling from more than $28.7 billion in 2016-2020 to $7.4 billion in 2021-2025. Targeted post-coup sanctions remain in place, but the fall in investment reflects a wider deterioration that also includes armed conflict, policy uncertainty, difficult business conditions, and major corporate exits. Inflation and foreign-exchange pressure further complicate long-term investment.
The SEZ now effectively sits in a conflict zone. The fighting between military forces and local resistance groups has reportedly intensified around the project area, with reports of violence against civilians by military forces. The road toward Thailand crosses conflict-affected parts of Tanintharyi Region. The Htee Khee border trade area has also been controlled by the Karen National Union and its allied resistance forces since May 2025. For a cross-border SEZ, reliable access and security will remain central to long-term investment and development.
In this tougher setting, the Myanmar military-backed administration began making efforts to revive the project last year. Closer post-coup ties with Russia have brought Dawei back into active investment talks on power plants, oil refineries, and seaports. In June 2026, the Russian state-owned firm Inter RAO and the Myanmar military-controlled Launglon Economic Development Company signed an agreement for a 660-megawatt coal-fired power plant. Russia is seeking majority stakes during the project payback period to meet its banks’ lending conditions. The broader project plan is under discussion. Financing remains unsettled and undisclosed.
Beyond Russia, Dawei is reappearing in regional economic diplomacy. In August, Thailand also held bilateral talks on the Htee Khee-Dawei corridor under its policy of “calibrated re-engagement” with Myanmar. A month later, when coup leader-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing visited Vietnam, Myanmar’s military-backed administration promoted Dawei to Vietnamese investors at a business forum in Hanoi. Dawei appears to be part of the new administration’s regional re-engagement talks, despite unresolved issues around financing, security, and implementation.
Alongside these challenges, the project’s revival raises concerns about its impact on local communities. A 2014 survey of more than 1,500 households reported concerns about land loss, limited consultation, and incomplete compensation. These concerns are now compounded by questions about ownership, transparency, environmental safeguards, and local benefits.
Dawei’s viability depends on more than building individual assets, but even that will be difficult under current conditions. The seaport, power plant, and transport links must support industry while also creating economic opportunities and benefits for communities. Without that wider ecosystem, Dawei could remain a scattered collection of infrastructure rather than a functioning and sustainable economic zone.