On September 16, 2025, South Korea’s Lee Jae-myung administration formally adopted Arctic shipping development as a national policy. The Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries has subsequently moved to Busan, aiming to establish the city as South Korea’s maritime hub for Arctic shipping.
South Korea sent its first trial container, the PanStar Acro (under the flag of Panama), via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to Europe in August 2026, following a few weeks behind the Chinese container ship Dubai Tower (under the flag of Liberia).
On September 11, 2026, Hanwha Ocean, one of Korea’s big three shipbuilders, began constructing the country’s second ice-breaker, which is expected to be more than twice the size and 50 percent better than the existing RV Araon.
South Korea, an Asian middle power, is clearly ambitious about seizing potential economic and strategic opportunities of the development of Arctic shipping. The challenges and prospects for South Korea’s Arctic ambitions hold insights for other interested countries as well.
The Arctic is warming at an alarming rate due to human-induced climate change. According to NASA, in September, when the Arctic sea ice reaches its minimum extent, the ice-covered area is now “shrinking at a rate of 12.2 percent per decade, compared to its average extent during the period from 1981 to 2010.” A decrease in the extent of sea ice and the loss of older, thick ice makes longer navigation seasons possible and generates new access to previously difficult to reach regions of the Arctic.
According to the Arctic Council, the number of ships operating in the Arctic reached a record high in 2025, with 1,812 unique ships entered the Arctic Polar Code area. This is a 40 percent increase compared to 2013. The shipping activities in the Arctic are likely to further increase in years to come, since the Arctic Ocean could possibly have its first ice-free day in summer 2027.
The Arctic shipping routes, especially the NSR along the Russian Arctic coastline, could cut shipping times by 10-20 days between East Asia and Europe, compared to traditional routes via the Strait Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope. Moreover, the freedom of navigation in “strategic chokepoints,” such as the Strait of Hormuz, is being shaken by geopolitics. This makes Arctic shipping routes strategically attractive for East Asian economies as an alternative for their foreign trade and energy security. China is so far the most active user of the NSR. And here comes South Korea.
In my view, the development of the NSR must be considered in the context of the China-Russia-U.S. strategic triangle. Both Russia and the United States are Arctic states, but they hold divergent views about the legal status of the NSR. Article 234 (“Ice-Covered Areas”) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a legal basis for Russia to exert jurisdiction over the NSR. However, Russia actually treats the NSR as its domestic waters. The United States, on the contrary, views the NSR as straits used for international navigation. Under this view, ships should have free transit rather than needing to apply for a permit from Russia’s Northern Sea Route General Administration.
China is in a tense geopolitical rivalry with the U.S., while Russia is now China’s most important partner in international affairs. Nevertheless, Russia and China have profound differences about how the Arctic should be governed. China is not openly challenging Russian regulation of the NSR, but that does not mean China is satisfied with Russia’s position. China wants to be seen as an equal partner with Arctic states and have a bigger say in Arctic governance.
Therefore, when South Korea enters into the scene as an active user of the NSR, there are potential risks and challenges from three aspects.
First, there is geopolitical risk. Russia is interested in increasing the use of the NSR and welcomes foreign investment and technology to develop the Russian Arctic. However, since the Ukraine War, national security concerns now supersede economic development and environmental protection in many parts of the Arctic. The region has sadly become confrontational again. Any future geopolitical incident, such as a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) by the U.S. against Russia’s “excessive claims” of the NSR, could spark fierce Russian retaliation. South Korea, as a U.S. ally, might be caught in the crossfire.
Second, and related, is the sanctions risk. The U.S. has introduced massive sanctions against Russian entities, both primary sanctions and secondary sanctions. Those sanctions paid special attention to Russia’s oil and gas industry as well as the banking system, to cut the Russian economy off from the West and reduce Russia’s revenue to fund its war. Secondary sanctions are particularly powerful. They are used to maintain or put additional pressure on the sanctions target by penalizing third parties that engage with the primary sanctions target in activities that could undermine or evade the purpose of the primary sanctions.
Therefore, Chinese and Japanese enterprises have become very cautious about doing business with Russia. For example, according to the website of Northern Sea Route General Administration, in 2025,only one Chinese-flagged ship submitted an application for a navigation permit on the NSR. The R/V Tan Suo San Hao is a scientific vessel owned by the Institute of Deep-sea Science and Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, which was delivered in 2024 with capacity to conduct scientific expedition in the Russian Arctic. China’s state-owned global shipping giant, COSCO, has tempered its enthusiasm about using the NSR. Rather, unknown shipping companies, such as New New Shipping and Sea Legend (which runs Dubai Tower), were established to provide regular container service only between Russian and Chinese ports, using the NSR. The U.S. secondary sanctions are applied universally. South Korea’s status as a U.S. ally does not necessarily shield its companies from future U.S. sanctions.
Third is the competition South Korea will face in Arctic shipping. China is the most active user state of the NSR so far. The Polar Silk Road was officially announced by China’s 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper. Originally, the PSR aimed to cover the whole Arctic as China’s overall strategy in the region. However, due to what I call a “push and pull effect” between the U.S., Russia, and China, the PSR has evolved to focus on collaboration with Russia.
Building upon China’s “unlimited” bilateral cooperation with Russia, the PSR has two dimensions. It reflects China’s strong interest in developing and using Arctic shipping routes, not only connecting the Chinese and Western European markets, but also China and the resource-rich Russian Arctic for China’s energy security. Therefore, South Korean companies will be facing economic and technological competition from Chinese companies in the Russian Arctic.
That being said, I think South Korea’s ambitions for Arctic shipping should be lauded. The NSR has potential to serve South Korea’s national interest as an alternative, strategic shipping route. Moreover, because Russia wants to diversify sources of foreign investment and increase the usage of NSR, South Korea’s interest in the Arctic shipping is likely to be welcomed by Russia. Therefore, South Korea could become a game changer in the Arctic amid geopolitical headwinds.
As a middle power that has been thriving in the epicenter of East Asian geopolitics for decades, South Korea has a proven record for managing great powers relations for national security and prosperity. Now it will try to make use of that experience in the Arctic.