The Houthis’ Path Into Iran’s War * The Gateway Pundit * by Antonio Graceffo

On July 22, 2026, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack on two Saudi oil tankers, the Encelia and Layla, transiting the Red Sea. The group said the vessels had violated a blockade it declared against Saudi Arabia on July 20.

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the tankers were targeted for violating the blockade imposed by the group’s armed forces. The attack marked the Houthis’ first strike on commercial shipping in recent months, opening a new front in the U.S.-Iran war.

The blockade followed the Yemeni government’s bombing of the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. The incident was part of some of the worst violence Yemen has seen in four years.

The Houthis initially remained on the sidelines after the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran began with the opening strikes on February 28, 2026, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Hezbollah and several Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces militias joined the fighting within two days by striking Israel and U.S. bases. The Houthis held back longer, a delay analysts attributed to a calculated decision made in coordination with Tehran rather than reluctance to fight.

That changed on March 28, when the Houthis resumed attacks on Israel that had been paused since the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire. They launched ballistic missiles and formally joined the war. Military spokesman Yahya Saree announced the strikes on Al Masirah, saying they would continue “until the aggression against all fronts of the resistance ceases.” Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi said his group stood with Iran and was ready to act “whenever developments require it.”

Al Jazeera’s analysis at the time described the relationship as one of coordination rather than pure subordination. It said the Houthis were trying to avoid a broad confrontation that could drain their resources and manpower inside Yemen. The same Stimson report noted that Israel had already eliminated much of the Houthi leadership, including the group’s chief of staff, in strikes in August 2025. As a result, Iran had to weigh the benefits of Houthi involvement against the risk of further decapitating an ally, as had already occurred with the IRGC and Hezbollah leadership.

The blockade traces to a July 13 escalation at Sanaa airport. An Iranian Mahan Air flight sought to carry a Houthi delegation home from Tehran after attending Khamenei’s funeral. Yemen’s internationally recognized government said it rejected Iran’s request for the flight, accused the Houthis of trying to bring the aircraft in without authorization, and struck the runway to block the landing. The plane diverted to Hodeidah.

Yemen’s Defense Minister, Gen. Taher al-Aqili, said the strike was meant to stop the delegation’s return, adding that Yemeni patience had run out. A Critical Threats Project analysis found that the Houthis imposed the blockade on July 20 only after it served their own objectives against Saudi Arabia. A separate analyst told The Hill that “Iran is not a bystander” in the episode because Tehran had facilitated the delegation’s flight.

The Houthis retaliated the same day with a missile and drone strike on Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. The Washington Post called it the sharpest such escalation in years, though it reported no casualties. Saree, speaking on Al Masirah, warned airlines to avoid Saudi airspace “until the siege on Sanaa airport is lifted.” He also declared the de-escalation phase of Yemen’s war over.

Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammed al-Bukhaiti said the strikes on Sanaa “will not pass without response and punishment.” The Saudi-led coalition said only that it had intercepted a ballistic missile threat aimed at the kingdom’s southern region, without confirming the original Sanaa strike. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei called the Sanaa strike a “clear violation of international law and the UN Charter.”

Tehran resumed its own blockade of Iranian ports on July 14, and CENTCOM said it had begun redirecting and disabling non-compliant commercial vessels as Brent crude climbed toward $100 a barrel amid the standstill in the Strait of Hormuz.

That same weekend, Jordan’s military intercepted three missiles fired from Iran, and Iranian strikes killed two U.S. soldiers stationed in Jordan.

The broader collapse driving this escalation traces to a memorandum of understanding the U.S. and Iran signed on June 17, 2026, which triggered a 60-day negotiation window and called for renewed U.S. strikes if Iran violated its terms. That framework broke down after Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps attacked commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz on July 6-7 for not sticking to a route Iran had unilaterally approved, prompting dozens of U.S. strikes inside Iran.

President Trump said afterward that he considers the MoU with Iran “over,” and Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said Tehran has likewise suspended all its own commitments under the deal. As of July 22-23, the US military carries out strikes on Iran even as Tehran continues to threaten and attack shipping in the Strait, to coerce commercial vessels into following its preferred routes and fee structure.

Reuters reported on July 23, that Iran flew Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and missile-related equipment into Houthi-held Yemen on July 13, about a week before the blockade declaration, to help bolster the group’s ability to threaten Red Sea shipping.

President Trump warned that the U.S. would hold Iran responsible for any further Houthi attacks on Saudi vessels, calling the group Iran’s “Surrogate and/or Proxy” and threatening “major military punishment” against both. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the same day that the Houthis had largely stayed out of the broader conflict until now, but “got snookered” by Iran into targeting Saudi Arabia.