The head of Uzatom, Uzbekistan’s atomic energy agency, Azim Akhmedkhadjayev said recently that the first small modular reactor of Uzbekistan’s ongoing nuclear power plant (NPP) project is to be commissioned in 2029, while the first large reactor will come online in 2033. The project itself will be completed in 2034-2035. The NPP will produce up to 17 billion kWh of electricity per year, which, according to Akhmedkhadjayev, will amount to 20 percent of the country’s energy production. Current annual production volume is 80 billion kWh.
Having an NPP is not a new dream for Uzbekistan. The first president of the country, Islam Karimov, also understood the need for a nuclear power plant, but never took concrete steps toward its realization. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, however, did not waste any time. In December 2017, just a year after Mirziyoyev came to power, Tashkent and Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear energy corporation, agreed to build a two-reactor NPP in Uzbekistan.
In 2019, Tashkent adopted a law “On the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes,” outlining a legal framework that includes state ownership rules, safety protocols, and so on. In 2024, Uzatom was established as an authorized body to implement state policy under the Cabinet of Ministers, replacing the Agency for the Development of Atomic Energy that had existed under the Ministry of Energy.
After years of negotiation and consideration of several different options, in September 2025, Uzbekistan and Rosatom finally signed an agreement to build an integrated nuclear power plant in Jizzakh with two small modular reactors (SMRs), specifically RITM-200N reactors, with a capacity of 55 megawatts each, and two large VVER-1000 reactors, each generating 1 GW. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Uzbekistan’s Mirziyoyev officially launched the construction of the plant in June this year at a ceremony held in Saint Petersburg.
The project was initially estimated to cost $10-13 billion; however, last month, Uzatom’s Akhmadkhodjayev said that the expected cost is $9.5 billion at most. Even this figure is arguably too big for Uzbekistan, whose external debt is already over $82 billion as of early 2026. Tashkent plans to attract around 85-90 percent of the NPP construction funds in the form of loans from diverse sources, hoping it will return over $165 billion to the state budget.
Tashkent has been trying to present the project as multilaterally financed; a project free from Russian loans.
“We are not currently considering Russian money, given all the geopolitical developments,” said Akhmadkhodjayev in March 2025. At the time, the project under consideration consisted of six small modular reactors, which were estimated to have a price tag of just $2 billion. He argued that the construction of the plant would not place Uzbekistan in a debt trap despite most of the money being planned to be borrowed from external actors.
“They [investors, lenders] will receive the profits generated by the nuclear power plant in the form of dividends. They will not have any involvement in the management [of the plant]. This is stupid,” explained Akhmadkhodjayev.
Half a year later, after the project had been revised to its final form — consisting of two small modular reactors and two large capacity reactors — the head of the directorate for the construction of nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan, Abdujamil Qalmuratov, voiced a different cost: $1 billion for the small reactors. He said that the money will come from the state budget.
“Yes, it’s the state budget. The state is building it — it’s a completely Uzbek project. The source of funding is our budget. The nuclear project must be national,” reinstated Qalmuratov.
Tashkent obviously prioritizes, at least in its rhetoric, its sovereignty and control of the NPP project. But it has not closed doors in Moscow’s face. In June 2026, as the construction of the plant in Jizzakh began, Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his readiness to make a financial commitment for the project, offering a preferential export loan.
“It is important that Russia will not only build the nuclear power plant, but will also provide its Uzbek partners with a preferential export loan and provide support throughout the entire life cycle of the plant,” noted Putin.
It is unlikely that Uzbekistan can cover the entire project with the state budget, so Tashkent is currently window shopping for external loans. Putin’s comment seems to be more of a political statement than a real deal, since no numbers have been given and there has been no news of a confirmed deal. Tashkent is likely exploring all of its options (including Chinese investment or multilateral financing through BRICS’ New Development Bank), trying to diversify the source of the funds so as not to tie itself to one actor, especially to Russia.
Not only does Tashkent intend to avoid Russian money, it is also actively trying to avoid full reliance on Russia in the construction, supply, and operating process. Last year Uzatom stated that it would form an international consortium to carry out the NPP project, seeking to employ not only Russian technology but also Chinese non-nuclear technologies, as well as European soft and hardware products. The agency also repeatedly states that the project is “under the strict supervision” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), signaling that the NPP is not an opaque, Moscow-controlled facility beyond outside scrutiny.
Tashkent is afraid that Western sanctions might affect the project, as they seem to have affected the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant – another Rosatom flagship nuclear plant project in Turkiye. Rosatom’s Director General Dmitry Likhachev spoke in May about the impacts of sanctions on its ongoing nuclear projects. Tashkent is observing that situation in real time and clearly thinking of how to protect its own plans. Involving as many diverse partners and lenders as possible is arguably a gambit to avoid the fate of the Akkuyu project.
Other questions arise when considering what will happen even after the plant is constructed. It has been promoted as necessary to fulfill Uzbekistan’s growing domestic energy demands. But, as the project requires an external loan that Tashkent will need to pay back, it is likely that much of the energy generated by the NPP will be sold to neighboring countries to make quick cash instead of meeting domestic demand.
Uzbekistan, which used to import electricity just a decade ago, has already become an electricity exporter, with the majority of this export going to neighboring countries. In 2025, Uzbekistan exported 500 million kWh of electricity to Kazakhstan, 400 million kWh to Tajikistan, 1.2 billion kWh to Kyrgyzstan, and more than 2 billion kWh to Afghanistan – all while citizens of Uzbekistan keep experiencing power outages due to high demand in peak seasons such as mid-summer and mid-winder. This approach, which in the eyes of many Uzbeks appears to prioritize the needs of its neighbors, is most likely linked to water-energy diplomacy (with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as they are upper-stream countries along the region’s two major rivers) and energy-support diplomacy (with Afghanistan). But people will become less patient with electricity shortages once the NPP starts operating, and that presents a genuine challenge for Tashkent.