Since Europe moved to close its market to Russian gas in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has actively sought new export markets.
But in 2024, Gazprom – once the world’s largest energy company – reported losses of 1.076 trillion rubles (around $12.89 billion), its first net loss in nearly 24 years, coming after a 2023 profit of 700 billion rubles ($7.51 billion). The situation for the Kremlin worsened when China declined to increase supplies under the Power of Siberia 2 Project, which was meant to offset the loss of 50 billion cubic meters of gas in Europe.
Still in search of new markets, last year Russian President Vladimir Putin reached an agreement with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev for the supply of Russian gas to Uzbekistan, known as the “reverse scheme.” The export of gas from Russia to Uzbekistan reached 5.6 billion cubic meters in 2024, with aims to increase the flow up to up to 11 billion cubic meters.
Uzbekistan, which has its own gas industry, uses Russian gas to address its growing domestic demands, while allowing Tashkent to continue exporting gas to China. Uzbekistan is cashing in on hard currency (approximately $160 per thousand cubic meters) for exports to China while it pays a much lower price for imported Russian gas.
As the gas export crisis is still acute for Russia, the Kremlin is also lobbying to supply Russian gas to northern Kazakhstan, including the capital of Kazakhstan – Astana. Despite western Kazakhstan’s vast gas and oil deposits, the northern regions of the country are not gasified. Gasifying these regions, where over 2 million ethnic Russians live, presents significant geopolitical risks to Kazakhstan similar to those in eastern Ukraine.
It is no secret that Russia has repeatedly used gas supplies as a tool of political pressure. Currently, three-quarters of exported Kazakh oil transits through the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The pipelines critical to Kazakhstan’s exports through Russia are occasionally shut down, on various technical pretexts. These shutdowns often coincide with problems in bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia in other areas, suggesting a political motivation.
The prospect of importing Russian gas to northern Kazakhstan should prompt consideration of how the country uses its own abundant resources. In the country’s oil and gas-rich west, much of the gas produced is reinjected back into the oil reservoirs at fields like Karachaganak, Tengiz, and Kashagan. As oil production is projected to decrease in five to seven years, it will be important for the Kazakh government to make plans for the future utilization of this gas.
Increasing gas exports will require pipelines. Thus, the Kazakhstan government should negotiate with Russia to ease Moscow’s stern stance on building an oil and gas pipeline from Kazakhstan across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Turkiye, and then Europe. Russia and Iran have long blocked progress on such routes to expand export of energy from Central Asia to world markets, often using as a pretext discussions on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea.
Kazakhstan can currently supply oil and gas to German refineries via the Druzhba pipeline, but that still relies on Russia’s permission. Ensuring energy security via diversification of export routes is crucial for Kazakhstan, and laying a pipeline across the bed of the Caspian Sea is essential for Kazakh energy stability and political independence.
The costs of laying a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea could be shared with Turkmenistan, which also stands to benefit. And the EU may be enticed to help with financing too. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have, together, the fourth-largest gas reserves globally, and can replace Russian or costly American liquefied natural gas in Europe, meeting Europe’s needs for decades to come.
At the recent EU-Central Asia summit, held on April 3-4 in Samarkand, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans to invest over 12 billion euros in regional infrastructure development. Concurrently, China is making significant investments in expanding logistics on the Kazakh coast of the Caspian Sea as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Current geopolitical conditions, as tumultuous as they are, are nevertheless conducive for Kazakhstan to achieve energy independence from Russia.
Europe would support such a project given increasingly unpredictable trade relations between Europe and the United States. China’s development of oil and gas deposits in western Kazakhstan would favor increasing exports too, but most important is Russia’s reduced geopolitical influence in the region. In 2023, Russia lost its economic hegemony to China for the first time since the Russian Empire colonized Central Asia. According to 2024 data, trade volumes between Kazakhstan and China have exceeded $40 billion, compared to $27 billion between Kazakhstan and Russia. A similar situation can be observed in Uzbekistan as well.
Today Kazakhstan has a crucial opportunity to diversify its oil and gas pipelines given Russia’s geopolitical and economic weaknesses. To maintain economic and political independence, the Kazakhstan government must act quickly by capitalizing on Russia’s own desire to seek new markets for it gas. The Russian willingness to export gas to northern Kazakhstan should have a price – and that price should be Moscow’s acquiescence for Kazakhstan to sell its own gas to Europe, bypassing Russia.