Corruption scandals in Uzbekistan are becoming louder, more sector-specific, and more politically significant. On June 26, officials from the National Anti-Corruption Council, a body chaired by Tanzila Norboyeva (who also heads the Uzbek Senate), revealed at a meeting held at the Ministry of Water Resources that 243 corruption-related crimes had been committed by 301 ministry employees over the past two and a half years, causing more than 70 billion Uzbek som ($5.8 million) in damages. The figure is alarming. Even more concerning is what it might reveal about the sector’s underlying structure.
The question at the heart of the matter is not simply why some officials abuse their power; it is why corruption continues to thrive in one of Uzbekistan’s most strategically important sectors.
Water has long been a politically important resource for Uzbekistan, with significant environmental, socio-economic, and geopolitical implications. But growing scarcity and regional pressures have increased its strategic importance. The country is one of the most water-stressed countries in Eurasia, with the largest population in Central Asia. Up to 90 percent of Uzbekistan’s freshwater is used for agriculture. That sector, although it provides 25 percent of the country’s GDP and total employment, is notoriously disadvantaged by leaky pipes, poorly maintained canals, and outdated irrigation systems.
Water is the foundation for food security, rural income, export capacity, energy demand, and regional stability. With more frequent droughts, growing population numbers, Afghanistan’s advancing Qosh Tepa canal project, and recurring corruption cases in the water sector, every irrigation decision is likely to carry more pronounced economic and political consequences.
The water sector itself, however, remains physically and institutionally vulnerable. Many of Uzbekistan’s irrigation systems were established during the Soviet era, when the country focused heavily on growing cotton and wheat, which consumed most irrigation water and government spending on agriculture. Over the past several years, there have been some improvements, but the way prices are set for water and how irrigation is managed are still not very effective. Many canals, pumping stations, and drainage systems still reflect that old system. In fact, just last year, the World Bank approved a $200 million project to modernize Uzbekistan’s irrigation and drainage systems, aiming to reduce water loss and improve energy efficiency. While agriculture has become more diverse and the market has evolved, the way water is managed and allocated has not adapted as quickly to these changes or to the pressures of climate change.
This is why corruption in the water sector should not be understood only as individual misconduct. It is a predictable risk in a system where three conditions add up: scarcity, discretion, and weak accountability.
Water is not always available in sufficient quantity, at the right time, for all users. This scarcity gives water administrative value. In a water-abundant system, allocation decisions matter less. In a water-stressed system, every irrigation schedule, pumping decision, and canal release can determine whether a farmer saves or loses a crop. In other words, water allocation is not a routine technical decision; it directly affects rural income, food production, and economic stability. The World Bank also notes that Uzbekistan’s irrigated agriculture is exposed to drought and future water shortages caused by climate change and growing competition for scarce water resources. When access to water becomes economically decisive, the official who controls timing, volume, or priority acquires enormous informal power.
Such officials have high discretion. Discretion, in this context, refers to the authority to determine who gets access to water, when they receive it, how much they get, and the order in which people receive it, especially when there are uncertainties about the water supply or when the supply is limited. Water cannot always be distributed mechanically or equally. Officials must consider crop type, weather, seasonal availability, canal capacity, pumping conditions, upstream withdrawals, and emergency needs. Some discretion is necessary. But when discretion is not governed by transparent rules, published schedules, measurable indicators, and independent verification, it becomes an opportunity for corruption.
For example, in south India, hydrological engineers received under-the-table payments for allocating water and for public works contracts. These fees often went up through various levels of management and politics. For some officials, the salary became the least motivating part of the job. What really increased a position’s value were the unofficial opportunities that came with it. Irrigation systems can generate systemic rather than isolated bribery by low-ranking officers.
Similar patterns have also been documented in Pakistan’s public canal irrigation system, where researchers found that farmers made illegal payments to obtain more water or preferential access during periods of scarcity. The study concluded that corruption distorted water allocation throughout the irrigation system rather than occurring as isolated acts of bribery.
Irrigation systems around the world tend to create similar behaviors, especially when individual officials have a lot of control over valuable resources like water.
Finally, accountability remains difficult because water is hard to monitor. Accountability here means the ability of various people and groups, including farmers, auditors, prosecutors, local councils, civil society, and higher-level agencies, to verify whether water was allocated according to objective rules, whether infrastructure actually worked, and whether reported data reflected reality. A missing budget payment can be traced. A suspicious procurement contract can be reviewed. But water leakage, unauthorized diversion, delayed pumping, manipulated measurement, or selective delivery can be much harder to prove.
In fact, the World Bank highlighted that corruption can happen at many points in the water sector, from making policies and granting licenses to construction, billing, and service delivery. The potential for corruption is present throughout the entire system, rather than being limited to just procurement activities. This is what we call “invisible corruption.” It’s not dramatic bribery scandals that undermine trust; rather it is small actions that can consistently erode trust. Tampering with reports, faking maintenance, inflating costs, neglecting inspections, and giving special treatment to certain individuals all serve to chip away at public trust in the system’s rules as written. Recognizing these governance risks, the World Bank’s $200 million Irrigation Modernization Project for Uzbekistan is investing not only in physical infrastructure like concrete and canals, but also in enhancing governance, increasing transparency, and ensuring fairer water distribution, with the expectation that success is measured by whether communities receive improved services.
The government is taking immediate steps to tackle corruption in the water sector by creating a new plan aimed at improving integrity. This plan will focus on several issues, including the slow adoption of digital technology, misuse of public funds, problems with managing water resources, and potential conflicts of interest among officials. The Anti-Corruption Agency has been given ten days starting from June 26 to create this roadmap, highlighting the government’s commitment to addressing the problem. However, international experience suggests that corruption in water management cannot be solved through investigations, criminal prosecutions, or new regulations alone. The effectiveness of any roadmap will ultimately depend less on the quality of the document itself than on whether it changes the incentives, controls, and accountability mechanisms that shape everyday decisions throughout the water sector.
No one refutes the existence of corruption in the water sector. But can the system adapt to better handle corruption amid increasing challenges posed by growing water scarcity? As long as water remains scarce, officials have uncontrolled or excessive discretion, and accountability remains weak, the risks of corruption will remain high, no matter how many individual offenders are caught. Unless water allocation, infrastructure maintenance, procurement, subsidy administration, and internal controls become more transparent, digitalized, and independently verifiable, persistent institutional incentives are likely to produce similar outcomes in the future.
In the end, the measure of success should not just be the number of corruption cases that come to light each year. Instead, Uzbek authorities should focus on reducing the probability of corruption in the first place. Real reform in the water sector means building a system that makes corruption harder to commit, easier to detect, and less rewarding for those who might try.
This research was supported by a Marie Curie Staff Exchange within the Horizon Europe Programme (CARSI, no: 101086415)