On September 21, 2024, the Quad Leaders’ Summit – symbolically held at U.S. President Joe Biden’s home in Wilmington, Delaware – announced ambitious new initiatives cutting across healthcare (“Quad Cancer Moonshot”) and sustainable infrastructure (“Quad Ports of the Future Partnership”). It also marked a continuation in expanding the Quad as an anchor in the Indo-Pacific for emerging technologies, including in the areas of 5G and cybersecurity.
This was a crucial summit, marking the last Quad summit of the Biden administration and the Kishida administration in Japan, as well as the first of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third term. Heading into the next Quad Leaders’ Summit in India in 2025, what are New Delhi’s priorities?
Unlike Canberra, Washington, and Tokyo, which have officially declared priorities for international engagements around emerging technologies, New Delhi does not have a publicly articulated strategy, so its strategy must – as with other facets of its strategic culture – be parsed from observable trends.
In 2023, India overtook China to become the most populous country in the world, with a population peak still some decades away. India is also in the midst of a demographic dividend projected to reach its zenith between 2047 and 2068. Currently, a fifth of the global population under 25 lives in India. Young Indians represent a significant and growing bloc of voters: the recent election saw the participation of over 20 million voters aged between 18 and 29.
Critical and emerging technologies are, in New Delhi’s view, the biggest strategic differentiator in determining economic prosperity in the coming decades, especially as their impact on labor markets remains largely speculative. It is unsurprising then that during the 2024 Indian general elections, unemployment and economic inequality – major pillars of the opposition coalition’s campaign – resonated deeply with the electorate, especially young voters.
The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has over three election cycles consistently emphasized inclusive economic growth (epitomized in the slogan “sabka saath, sabka vikas” or “development for all”), establishing India as a manufacturing hub (aatmanirbhar bharat, or “self-sufficient India”), and education and skilling. Consistent with these priorities, the Modi government has implemented policies to enhance domestic production capacity: the Scheme for Promotion of Manufacturing of Electronic Components and Semiconductors (SPECs) and Production-Linked Incentives (PLIs) are designed to boost local manufacturing, with the aim to make India a major electronics production hub.
According to Indian government officials, since the launch of the $24 billion PLI scheme in 2020, about $1.02 billion in incentives have been disbursed to foreign and domestic companies registered in India to set up manufacturing units in the country. Recipients include Foxconn, Wistron, and Pegatron. Similarly, Modi launched Skill India in 2015 with the aim of providing vocational training and certifications to 400 million people by 2025, and has sought to expand e-government services for distribution of benefit programs, health services, loans etc.
In 2020, I co-wrote a report on the need for a cohesive tech foreign policy for India, outlining several points of friction. Multilateral negotiations on state behavior in cyberspace are fractured, while e-commerce regulations are mired in debates around equity and security. Standard-setting organizations have become a new frontier for exerting geoeconomic influence. Methodologies for how to quantify the digital economy are still unsettled, even as data flows have replaced traditional goods and services as the driver of globalization.
In this context, trusted or like-minded partnerships are vital for India. Consistent with residual but evolving notions of “strategic autonomy,” New Delhi has cast a “wide net” by joining a web of minilaterals, including the Quad, the I2U2 (India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the United States), and the India-South Korea-U.S. Trilateral Technology Dialogue.
India has also supported the (balanced) expansion of existing groupings like the G-20, which welcomed the African Union as a permanent member during India’s presidency in 2023. Additionally, BRICS, the grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, added the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran as members in early 2024 but there was speculation that New Delhi was not wholly enthusiastic about the expansion, especially as it may eventually upend the balance with China. In both groupings, India has epitomized its traditional “bridge-building” role in the tech realm through digital public infrastructure.
The utility and momentum of each partnership, however, will modulate. The I2U2, for instance, launched with much fanfare during the U.N. General Assembly in September 2023, before going into a year-long (and counting) hibernation in the aftermath of the October 7 attack and subsequent war in Gaza. However, even as the relationship between UAE and Israel has soured, India has continued cooperation with the members through joint ventures and continued Track 1.5 engagements.
For example, Israel’s Tower Semiconductor, in partnership with India’s Adani Group, announced plans to build a $10 billion semiconductor project. (Tower Semiconductor was initially bidding for a chip project as part of the International Semiconductor Consortium, a joint venture with the UAE’s Next Orbit Ventures, which fell through amidst legal disputes.) Furthermore, last month, an Indian think tank established a Deep Tech Network (with Track 1 participation from the United States, India, and UAE).
Similarly, even as some of the Quad’s more ambitious education and skilling initiatives like the Quad Fellowship build momentum, New Delhi will continue to expand bilaterally in this space. For example, an India-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on mutual recognition of academic qualifications, along the lines of those already signed between India-U.K. and Australia-India, will be a key priority.
India’s approach to international engagement in technology sectors is rooted in its desire for self-reliance and strategic autonomy. While this “my way” approach can be puzzling to its partners, it’s essential to recognize the broader geopolitical dynamics at play. Countries engage with India due to a confluence of economic and market incentives, as well as its geopolitical positioning in relation to China’s growing influence. Therefore, while India’s engagements may seem transactional and at times contradictory, they are deeply pragmatic, which is what makes it an attractive partner.
Whether through its role in minilaterals spaces like the Quad, the I2U2 and BRICS, or its bilateral initiatives, New Delhi’s growing importance stems from this dichotomy: leveraging opportunities for self-gain while simultaneously fulfilling its strategic role in the international arena. This is a delicate balance that will continue to shape its international engagements in the critical and emerging technology space.