Since the second Trump administration was inaugurated, the world has watched with a mix of hope and anxiety as U.S. domestic and foreign policies have departed wildly from long-established norms. President Donald Trump’s claim that the U.S. has borne an excessive burden, along with demands for greater contributions from Europe, Japan, and other allies, and even comments that undermine the alliances themselves, have shaken the unity that had been painstakingly sought by the Biden administration. With his deep distrust of international institutions, Trump has already signed an executive order withdrawing the U.S. from the UN Commission on Human Rights. Meanwhile, the dismantling of USAID has sent shockwaves through aid sectors across the globe.
For Asia, the most significant revelation has been Trump’s rejection of economic globalism and his clear inclination towards protectionism. Tariffs are often regarded as a form of “transactional” diplomacy: high tariffs might occasionally be threatened, but provided demands are met they are ultimately not implemented. Trump sent shockwaves around the world by announcing – and then suspending – what he called “reciprocal tariffs,” which were in fact calculated based on U.S. trade deficits with its individual trading partners. In minutes, Trump had shredded the free and open economic order supported by the GATT/WTO system. These abrupt shifts in U.S. economic policy have raised serious concerns in East Asia and regional industry, which relies on supply chains built upon open cross-border business.
While China has made rapid gains, the U.S. remains the world’s preeminent superpower. Moving forward, however, it is clear that the U.S. will pursue its own interests rather than being the primary pillar of the global order, as it has been throughout the post-Cold War period. It should be noted that this shift to the kind of behavior historically more usually been associated with great powers did not begin with the Trump administration, but is in fact a long-term trend. Nonetheless, Trump’s policies in particular have upended alliance networks, international institutions, the economy, and universal values across multiple fields. They have also made clear just how dependent Asia and the rest of the world have been on the U.S.
With rapidly rising uncertainty within the regional order in Asia, Japan and ASEAN countries need to work together more closely than ever before. Still, their cooperation does not change the reality that they remain heavily dependent on the United States. For its part, Japan is part of an alliance and is highly reliant on the U.S. for its own security. Since China’s emergence as a major power, Japan has stepped up security cooperation with the U.S. in a number of areas. The Philippines also relies heavily on the U.S. for security, particularly compared to other ASEAN countries. Thailand is a treaty ally of the U.S., while Singapore and Malaysia have informally worked with the U.S. on defense, seeking to maintain a continued U.S. presence in Southeast Asia as a counter to China. However, neither country is as closely aligned with the U.S. in defense as Japan is.
There are significant differences between Japan and Southeast Asia in the realm of values. Singapore’s Bilahari Kausikan, a former diplomat and well-known commentator, has argued (in Foreign Affairs, for instance) that Trump’s efforts to dismantle democratic institutions in the U.S. are not a major concern in Southeast Asia, where skepticism toward Western values has always been present. Japan is different. While skepticism and resistance to a Western-centric world do exist, postwar Japan has embraced the values of advanced democratic countries as a model. It has achieved these values to some extent and has built a peaceful, democratic society. This achievement has now become a part of Japan’s national identity. For many Japanese people, it is hard to turn away from what is happening in the U.S., which they have long seen as a model.
Tokyo now needs to deal with a burgeoning trade war between the U.S. and China, together with sharp shifts in U.S. policy. Japan is not part of a regional organization like ASEAN, which acts as a buffer against external pressures and challenges. It is true that the active independent diplomacy of ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia’s accession to BRICS, is notable, and this raises the question of how much longer ASEAN centrality can be maintained. Still, it was interesting to note that in February, Malaysia, acting as ASEAN chair, alluded to plans for a U.S.-ASEAN summit aimed at expressing regional opinions on U.S. tariff policies. Irrespective of whether this initiative comes to anything, ASEAN countries do at least have a framework for coordinating individual opinions on external challenges and negotiating with outside powers collectively. This is something Japan lacks.
While recognizing these differences, both Japan and ASEAN need to cooperate to create a highly predictable strategic environment within the region and work to keep the economic order as free and as open as possible. That will require a multifaceted and sophisticated diplomatic approach that involves strengthening partnerships with major powers, middle powers, and small countries. Now more than ever it is vital that Japan and ASEAN countries strengthen partnerships.